It is a fact of life that errors in logic, no less than errors in physics, can cause airplanes to crash, medical treatments to fail, and so on. Nominalism is correct there are no ab- stracta. As a correspondence theorist of my ilk he claims that truth requires a systematic connection between true sen- tences propositions, beliefs.
I agree that logical constants play a central role in logical consequence and that not every constant can serve as a logical constant in an adequate logic.
This we cannot do. It may be an accident that the truth-predicate is used for blind endorsement in our language, but this does not mean it is an accident that we have a truth predi- cate in our language.
And I disagree that the project of distinguishing logical and nonlogical constants in a normative manner is doomed to failure. Its quan- tification, therefore, can be nominal in one position, sentential in another. But this is an illusion. The existence of this language demonstrates that there is no theoretical need for a truth predicate in our language.
The metaphysical claim is that there are no substantive common- alities of truths: Even the study of ref- erence and satisfaction is outside the boundaries of this theory.
This hardly shows, of course, that no other theory of truth is forthcoming—even granting my nominalism; for, no doubt, readers can think of or anyway, recollect other ways that truths can be seen as having uniform properties. Our inability to see how it is possible that A is true while B is false leads us to think in modal as well as alethic terms: Is every ob- jectual approach to logical consequence metaphysical?
Philosophia Mathematica The positions that Azzouni develops here are bold and contentious. Simmons, Oxford University Press, Oxford, By regarding all truths as based on forms of correspondence we achieve a great deal of substantive unity; by distinguishing different forms of correspondence we take note of systematic differences.
This does not mean that we have to reject the semantic notion of logical conse- quence altogether. The same idiom can be used in one context in one way, in a different context in another: A implies B iff there is no model in which A is true and B is false. B The semantic definition of logical consequence fails to capture the intended modality.Jody Azzouni, Deflating Jody Azzouni’s book covers a variety of topics in metaphysics, In this review I will focus on Azzouni’s radical proposal about.
Project Euclid - mathematics and statistics online. Notre Dame J. Formal Logic; Volume 50, Number 1 (), Book Review: Jody Azzouni.
Tracking Reason: Proof, Consequence, and Truth. Oxford University Press, Oxford, vi + pages. 1 Introduction Jodi Azzouni’s Tracking Reason offers an interconnected view of truth, mathematical proof, and logical consequence. Tracking Reason has 3 ratings and 0 reviews. When ordinary people--mathematicians among them--take something to follow (deductively) from something else, /5(3).
Download Citation on ResearchGate | On Apr 1,Julian C. Cole and others published Book Review: Jody Azzouni. Deflating Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism }.
Tracking Reason: Proof, Consequence, and Truth The Amazon Book Review Author interviews, book reviews, Tracking Reason resembles Jody Azzounis previous book, 4/5(1).Download